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IT TAKES A MIRACLE: AN ANALYSIS OF 




1. Introduction and Justification
In this article, I present a brief  analysis of  some interrelated issues that are 
highlighted by John Walton in his recent book The Lost World of  Genesis One.1 
My goal is to evaluate his interpretation of  Genesis 1 in connection with his 
view of  miracles and theology-science relations. The focus of  my analysis is 
justified in three ways: 
First, it is justified by Walton’s summary description of  what he has 
presented in his book: 
The position that I have proposed regarding Genesis 1 may be designated 
the cosmic temple inauguration view. This label picks up the most important 
aspect of  the view: that the cosmos is being given its functions as God’s 
temple, where he has taken up his residence and from where he runs the 
cosmos. The world is his headquarters.2 
Second, Walton introduces the concept of  miracles in close connection 
with his first two propositions concerning the inauguration of  cosmic temple 
functions. He proposes that Genesis 1 is ancient cosmology (proposition 1) 
and, therefore, it is functional cosmology (proposition 2).3 Furthermore, he 
concludes that in Genesis 1, as in other ancient cosmologies, “there were no 
[supernatural] ‘miracles’ (in the sense of  events deviating from that which was 
‘natural’).”4
1John H. Walton, The Lost World of  Genesis One: Ancient Cosmology and the Origins 
Debate (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Academic, 2009). 
2Ibid., 162, emphasis original. The “cosmic temple,” as Walton terms it, is what 
we commonly refer to as the cosmos or universe.  
3Ibid., 16-37. Each chapter of  Walton’s book addresses a specific proposition. In 
this article, I reference these propositions in parenthetical notations.
4Ibid., 20. Walton also makes the same point about miracles in an opposite way: 
“There is nothing ‘natural’ about the world in biblical theology, nor should there be 
in ours” (ibid.). These two ways of  describing miracles are possible because Walton 
regards God’s actions as supernatural from a theological perspective and as natural 
from a nontheological perspective. According to Walton, “a biblical view of  God’s 
role as Creator in the world does not require a mutually exclusive dichotomy between 
‘natural’ and ‘supernatural’” (140). “The common dichotomy drawn today between 
‘natural’ and ‘supernatural’ did not exist in the ancient world” (134). See also the 
discussion of  propositions 15-18 below.
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Third, Walton draws implications for theology-science relations based on 
his cosmic-temple-inauguration interpretation of  Genesis 1. At the beginning 
of  chapter 13, he writes: “We have now completed the presentation of  the 
view that Genesis 1 presents an account of  functional origins and will begin 
to integrate this view into the broader issues of  science and society.”5 His goal 
is that “God’s work is [to be] fully integrated with our scientific worldview.”6
While my brief  review seeks to present an accurate interpretation of  
Walton’s views, I recognize that every interpretation inevitably involves the 
risk of  misinterpretation. In my assessment of  Walton’s views, I can only 
present some areas where I agree or disagree with him and some reasons for 
my conclusions. His book deserves a much more extensive analysis than I can 
present here. I have learned much from reading his book and I hope that my 
review will highlight additional aspects of  some important issues that he has 
addressed. In the next section, I describe and assess his view of  miracles and 
the inauguration of  cosmic-temple functions as described in Genesis 1. 
2. Interpretation of  Genesis 1
2.1. Description of  Walton’s View
Walton seeks to ground his views of  miracles and cosmic-temple inauguration 
in what he believes to be an accurate interpretation of  what Genesis 1 “really 
says” (i.e., “the intended communication of  the author and the ability of  the 
audience to receive that same intended message”) in its cultural context.7 In 
this way, Walton also seeks to understand God’s intention, since “God has 
communicated through human authors and their intentions.”8  
Walton’s interpretation of  Genesis 1 may be summarized as follows: 
cosmic functions were created (proposition 3) from a nonfunctional beginning 
5Ibid., 114. Sean Cordry suggests that Walton’s “thesis has tremendous potential 
to reshape much of  the ‘science-religion’ debate” (“The Lost World of  Genesis One: 
Ancient Cosmology and the Origins Debate,” in Perspectives on Science and Christian Faith, 
62/3 [2010]: 2270. 
6Walton, 143.
7Ibid., 102. This is the “face value” or “literal” interpretation of  the text (ibid.). 
Walton, 102-104, further explains, “The same words can be used in a straightforward 
manner, or be used in a symbolic, metaphorical, sarcastic or allegorical way. . . . If  a 
communication is intended to be metaphorical, the interpreter interested in the face 
value will want to recognize it as a metaphor. If  the author intends to give a history, 
the interpreter must be committed to reading it that way. . . . If  the Israelites, along 
with the rest of  the ancient Near East, thought of  existence and therefore creation 
in functional terms, and they saw a close relationship between the cosmos and the 
temple, then those are part of  the face value of  the text and we must include them in 
our interpretation.”
8Ibid., 106.
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state (proposition 4) during three days of  establishing functions (proposition 
5), three days of  installing functionaries (proposition 6), and one day of  divine 
rest (proposition 7) in the cosmic temple (proposition 8).9 “These [creation 
days] are seven twenty-four hour days. This has always been the best reading 
of  the Hebrew text.”10 
For the purposes of  my assessment below, I must ask the following 
question: How could all the events mentioned in Genesis 1 happen in seven 
days without supernatural miracles? Walton’s answer to this question is evident 
in his interpretation of  Genesis 1, which he believes to be a statement about 
God’s ceremonial/liturgical inauguration of  cosmic functions (proposition 9), 
rather than a statement about the material origins of  the cosmos (proposition 
10).11 While not denying that God is the source of  material origins,12 Walton 
regards the functional-origin interpretation of  Genesis 1 as providing a more 
accurate interpretation (proposition 11) than other approaches (proposition 
12)13 that “are struggling to reconcile the scientific findings about the material 
cosmos with the biblical record.”14 
9Ibid., 38-86. 
10Ibid., 91. See also John Walton, Genesis, NIV Application Commentary (Grand 
Rapids: Zondervan, 2001), 71.
11Walton, The Lost World of  Genesis One, 87-101. 
12Walton writes: “If  we conclude that Genesis 1 is not an account of  material 
origins, we are not thereby suggesting that God is not responsible for material origins. 
I firmly believe that God is fully responsible for material origins, and that, in fact, 
material origins do involve at some point creation out of  nothing. But that theological 
question is not the one we are asking. We are asking a textual question: What sort 
of  origins account do we find in Genesis 1? Or what aspect of  origins is addressed 
in Genesis 1?” (ibid., 44). He proposes that “A very clear statement must be made: 
Viewing Genesis 1 as an account of  functional origins of  the cosmos as temple does not in any way 
suggest or imply that God was uninvolved in material origins—it only contends that Genesis 1 is not 
that story” (ibid., 96). Therefore, “If  we say that the text includes a material element 
alongside the functional, this view has to be demonstrated, not just retained because it 
is the perspective most familiar to us” (ibid., 93-94).
13Ibid., 102-113. Walton discusses the interpretive approaches of  Young and Old 
Earth Creationism, the Framework Hypothesis, and various forms of  Gap Theory 
(ibid., 108-113). 
14Ibid., 113. Walton, ibid., rejects approaches that “assume that the biblical account 
needs to be treated as an account of  material origins, and therefore that the ‘different’ 
scientific account of  material origins poses a threat to the credibility of  the biblical 
account that has to be resolved. This book has proposed, instead, that Genesis 1 was 
never intended to offer an account of  material origins and that the original author and 
audience did not view it that way. In fact, the material cosmos was of  little significance 
to them when it came to the question of  origins.”
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The nature of  Walton’s inauguration interpretation of  functional creation 
in Genesis 1 is evident in his comment on the relationship of  the temple and 
the cosmos. 
[T]he creation of  one is also the creation of  the other. The temple is made 
functional in the inauguration ceremonies, and therefore the temple is created 
in the inauguration ceremony. So also the cosmic temple would be made 
functional (created) in the inauguration ceremony. . . . The inauguration of  
the cosmic temple—its actual creation, [was] accomplished by proclaiming 
its functions, installing its functionaries, and, most importantly, becoming 
the place of  God’s residence.15
For Walton, Genesis 1 does not describe the material origin of  the 
cosmos as taking place in seven days. Rather it describes the ceremonial and 
liturgical creation of  the cosmos in seven days.16 
Assessment of  Walton’s View
One way in which Walton’s view of  miracles and the inauguration of  cosmic 
functions should be evaluated is in terms of  the success or failure of  his goals, 
which are to understand “what the Bible communicates,” to “preserve” and 
15Ibid., 88, 93. Walton argues that from the perspective of  the ancient Near 
East, “Creation takes place by giving things order, function, and purpose, which is 
synonymous with giving them existence” (Ancient Near East Thought and the Old Testament 
[Grand Rapids: Baker, 2006], 135). Compare an earlier statement: “It is difficult to 
discuss comparisons between Israelite and Mesopotamian literature concerning 
creation because the disparity is so marked” (John H. Walton, Ancient Israelite Literature 
in Its Cultural Context [Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1989], 26).
16Vern S. Poythress comments: “Walton correctly observes that Genesis 1 
focuses on practical functions rather than on chemical (material) composition. But 
sometimes he shifts to a second meaning of  ‘material’ and ‘function.’ He construes 
‘function’ as narrowly religious: The seven days of  Genesis 1 (which he construes as 
24-hour days) describe the inauguration of  a cosmic temple to its full functioning as 
a temple. Before the seven days there would still be an earlier ordinary operation of  
the astronomical, geological, and biological worlds over extended periods of  time. 
These earlier events belong to ‘the material phase’ that Genesis allegedly does not 
mention ([Walton] pp. 92-99). The label ‘material’ now includes all aspects of  physical 
appearance” (“Appearances Matter” in World Magazine 24/17, 29 August 2009 (<www.
worldmag.com/articles/15785>). Walton asks in response: “Did the Israelites believe 
their Old World Science? Undoubtedly they did. Did they ever think about the material 
aspect itself ? Again, undoubtedly. Does this mean the Bible is offering an authoritative 
revelation of  material origins? Not at all. The material language simply represents 
what they understood about the material world to convey the functional significance” 
(“John Walton Responds to Vern Poythress’s Review of  ‘The Lost World of  Genesis 
One,’” in The BioLogos Forum: Science and Faith in Dialog  (<http://biologos.org/blog/
john-walton-responds-to-vern-poythress>).
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“enhance” its “theological vitality,”17 and “to identify, truly and accurately . . . 
the thinking in the world of  the Bible.”18 
Walton seems to present his interpretation of  Genesis 1 with a mixture 
of  confidence and tentativeness. On one hand, he writes confidently: “I 
believe that this is a literal reading. A literal reading requires an understanding 
of  the Hebrew language and the Israelite culture. I believe that the reading 
that I have offered is the most literal reading possible at this point.”19 
On the other hand, Walton writes tentatively: 
Even if  the reader is not inclined to adopt the proposed interpretation 
of  Genesis 1, his or her theology could still be greatly enhanced by 
the observations offered here by embracing a renewed and informed 
commitment to God’s intimate involvement in the operation of  the cosmos 
from its incipience and into eternity. We all need to strengthen our theology 
of  creation and Creator whatever our view of  the Genesis account of  
origins.20  
This tentativeness is proper given the availability of  significant scholarly 
research that provides a viable alternative to Walton’s interpretation of  Genesis 
1. Richard Davidson21 and Kenton Sparks,22 like Walton, seek to interpret 
Scripture with attention to the divine and human dimensions and the cultural 
context, without forcing a harmony with current scientific conclusions.23 
Nevertheless, Davidson and Sparks propose views that are substantially 
different from Walton’s concerning supernatural miracles. 
Davidson proposes that Genesis 1 does present the concept of  
supernatural miracles with regard to material and functional origins, as well as 
with regard to divine interventions within the material and functional order. 
This interpretation is based on several factors: (1) the central doctrines of  
17Walton, The Lost World of  Genesis One, 7.
18Ibid., 19.
19Ibid., 170.
20Ibid., 150. Similarly, concerning Moshe Weinfeld’s suggestion “that Genesis 1 
could have served very effectively as the liturgy of  . . . a [creation] festival,” Walton 
comments that this “suggestion has much to commend it both textually and culturally, 
though definitive evidence is lacking” (ibid., 91). Later he states that “Even though it 
is natural for us to defend our exegesis, it is arguably even more important to defend 
our theology” (ibid., 150).  
21Richard M. Davidson, “The Biblical Account of  Origins,” in JATS 14/1 (2003): 
4-43.
22Kenton Sparks, God’s Words in Human Words: An Evangelical Appropriation of  
Critical Biblical Scholarship (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2008).
23See Davidson, 24, n. 69, and 86; see also idem, “Biblical Interpretation,” in 
Handbook of  Seventh-day Adventist Theology, ed. Raoul Dederen (Hagerstown, MD: 
Review and Herald, 2000), 58, 60, 69, 85, 86, 95. See also Sparks, 313-322. 
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Christianity, (2) the literal, historical genre of  Genesis 1 and the book of  
Genesis as a whole, (3) intertextual evidence from other parts of  the Bible, 
(4) the polemic of  Genesis 1 against other ancient cosmologies, (5) profound 
theology, (6) the commentary of  a majority of  scholars during the history of  
the church, and (7) the research of  a large number of  critical scholars who are 
not committed to traditional doctrines.24
Davidson’s conclusions are complemented by Sparks’s proposal that 
the concept of  supernatural miracles25 was widespread in ancient cultures. 
Sparks distinguishes between a providential miracle, which may be explained 
naturally, and a sign miracle, which is “an overt sign of  God’s supernatural 
power. . . . [Supernatural miracles] are not concealed within the events of  
history but occur . . . as obvious evidence that God’s hand has moved in 
history.”26 Concerning supernatural miracles, Sparks states: 
[T]he universal scope of  miracle testimonies gives one reason to suspect 
that miracles, while exceptional, do occur. . . . [These] miracles are possible 
only if  there is a sacred or divine realm that could break into the world 
of  our existence. . . . Indeed, the human perception that there is another 
dimension of  reality, to some extent distinct from our own, is a widespread 
phenomenon. Any student of  religion knows this.27 
In the next section, I describe and assess how Walton’s interpretation 
of  Genesis 1 and his view of  miracles influence his perspective on theology-
science relations.
 
3. Application to Theology-Science Relations
Description of  Walton’s View
Walton’s interpretation of  miracles and Genesis 1 is closely connected with 
his perspective on theology-science relations. First, as he views it, Genesis 1 
does not contemplate any contrast between primary and secondary causation, 
24Davidson, “The Biblical Account of  Origins,” 10-19. Compare Walton’s 
comments on ancient culture, genre, intertextual evidence, polemic, profound/strong 
theology, traditional interpretations (Walton, The Lost World of  Genesis One, 23-37, 97, 
102-107, 142-151, 171). Contrary to Walton, Paul Copan suggests that “A solid case 
can be made for creatio ex nihilo in the OT—that it is indeed demanded by the text” 
(“Creation ex Nihilo or ex Materia? A Critique of  the Mormon Doctrine of  Creation,” 
in Southern Baptist Journal of  Theology 9/2 [2005]: 34, emphasis original).
25Sparks, 316. 
26Ibid., 316. What Walton describes as natural miracle signs of  God’s constant 
action (Walton, The Lost World of  Genesis One, 20), Sparks, 316, identifies as providential 
miracles.
27Ibid., 317. By using this quotation, I do not intend to imply that Walton rejects 
the distinction between God’s reality and our reality. My purpose is to show how Sparks 
draws a different conclusion about supernatural miracles from this distinction.
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just as it does not contemplate any supernatural miracles that deviate from 
what is natural. For this reason, he proposes that theology and science present 
different perspectives on the same reality. The metaphysics of  primary 
causation is presented in theological accounts of  cosmic origins, while 
the metaphysics of  secondary causation is presented in scientific accounts 
(proposition 13).28 According to Walton, God is “carrying out his purposes 
through the naturalistic operations of  the cosmos . . . that . . . were decreed 
by the word of  God.”29 “What we identify as natural laws only take on their 
law-like quality because God acts so consistently in the operations of  the 
cosmos.”30 Therefore, “we should not expect anything in the Bible . . . to 
engage in the discussion of  how God’s level of  creative activity relates to . . . 
the laws of  nature.”31 
Second, the impact of  Walton’s view of  miracles on theology-science 
relations may be perceived in his proposal that Genesis 1 supports a unity in 
diversity between God’s actions of  creating and sustaining the functions of  
the cosmos (proposition 14). One might be tempted to assume that Walton 
opens a space for fundamentally different kinds of  miracles in his distinction 
between God’s acts of  creating and sustaining. That assumption, however, 
would be unfounded since he subsumes the act of  sustaining under the act 
of  creating such that there is an ongoing creation that does not deviate from 
the natural processes that are studied by science.32 He is also critical of  “the 
interventionist view [of  miracles] that treats the functionality of  natural 
processes too lightly, as being inadequate to accomplish God’s purposes.”33
Third, Walton proposes that, from a theological perspective, the cosmos 
is a designed and purposeful supernatural divine activity (proposition 15), 
while, from a scientific perspective, the cosmos is natural, without purpose 
or design (proposals 16 and 18).34 Therefore, he suggests that we should 
not separate “various aspects of  origins” according to “whether God did 
it [supernaturally] or [whether] a naturalistic process could be identified.”35 
Walton regards this as “a distinction that is essentially unbiblical.”36 For him, 
this distinction also leads to a “God of  the gaps” theology in which the 






34Ibid., 125-141, 152-161. 
35Ibid., 114.
36Ibid., 115.
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progress of  natural scientific explanations leaves less and less space for divine 
actions.37 
Fourth, Walton reasons that, within the reigning paradigm of  science, “to 
appeal to purpose is to shift to a different kind of  [nonscientific] explanation 
(e.g., metaphysical, theological). . . . If  scientists simply threw up their hands 
and admitted that a metaphysical, teleological explanation was necessary, they 
would be departing from that which is scientific.”38 Yet, Walton questions 
“whether we can assume such hard and fast lines of  distinction between the 
scientific and the metaphysical. It is true that observations can be put into 
one category or the other, but the fact is that such a categorization is artificial 
because none of  us has a worldview comprised of  only one of  them. Science 
and metaphysics blend together in life.”39 
Nevertheless, Walton takes a neutral theological position with regard 
to what science suggests about material origins, possibly because scientists 
“at this point . . . are not willing to rewrite the current rules of  science.”40 
He concludes that theology cannot be threatened by what science proposes 
because theology does not propose a description of  material origins.41 For 
him, this approach to theology-science relations does not produce a weaker 
theology; it produces a stronger one (proposition 17).42 “When God’s work 
is fully integrated with our scientific worldview and science is seen to give 
definition to what God is doing and how he is doing it, we regain a more biblical 
perspective of  the work—a perspective that is theologically healthier.”43 For 
Walton, such a theology should emphasize the following themes: (1) God’s 





41According to Walton, “Science cannot offer an unbiblical view of  material 
origins, because there is no biblical view of  material origins aside from the very general 
idea that whatever happened, whenever it happened, and however it happened, God 
did it” (ibid., 113). “[Genesis 1] looks to the future (how this cosmos will function 
for human beings with God at its center) rather than to the past (how God brought 
material into being)” (ibid., 118). “Q: When and how did God create the material 
world? A: According to the interpretation offered in this book, the Bible does not 
tell us, so we are left to figure it out as best we can with the intellectual capacity and 
other tools that God gave us. But the material world was created by him” (ibid., 169). 
“Genesis 1 gives us no cause to argue with the idea of  the physical world coming 
about by a slow process” (ibid., 150).
42Ibid., 142-151.
43Ibid., 143. 
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functions, (4) sacred space, (5) Sabbath, (6) order and disorder (sin), (7) the 
human role, and (8) the goodness of  creation.44 
Assessment of  Walton’s View
I agree with Walton’s concerns that (1) theological and scientific perspectives 
on causation should be kept distinct but not separate, (2) there is a sense in 
which divine creativity extends beyond the end of  God’s activity during the 
creation week, (3) theology should not be threatened by scientific progress 
or feel pressured to accommodate itself  to current scientific theories, and (4) 
scientists sometimes fail to be metaphysically neutral. I disagree, however, 
with some aspects of  his response to these concerns.
With regard to the first two concerns, I see no contradiction between 
the purposeful perspective of  Scripture and the terminology of  primary and 
secondary causation. It seems to me that Genesis suggests that God acts 
as primary cause when he miraculously creates the cosmos out of  nothing, 
miraculously sustains it so that it continues to exist, and miraculously intervenes 
within it. Yet there is room for freedom, since God’s miracles establish the 
cosmos as a secondary cause and enable secondary causes within the cosmos. 
This interpretation provides a viable alternative to Walton’s proposal that 
primary and secondary causation are simply different ways of  interpreting 
the cosmos. My interpretation also gives more definition to the paradox of  
intimate divine involvement with everything without compromising human 
freedom.45 
With regard to Walton’s other two concerns, his comments imply that 
theology and science inevitably influence each other either positively or 
negatively. Therefore, I propose that his effort to be neutral is futile. Moreover, 
his neutrality aims for full theology-science integration, which leads to a 
compromise of  biblical revelation concerning supernatural miracles. Instead, 
what we need is a mutually respectful dialogue between theology and science. 
In contrast to Walton’s theology-science integration, theology-science dialog 
can result in a stronger theology grounded in biblical revelation and a stronger 
science grounded in God’s general revelation in the cosmos.46
44Ibid., 142-151.
45Walton, 122, mentions “several times” that his proposal “does not result in 
a view of  God as a micromanager, but it insists that he cannot be removed from 
the ongoing operations.” He concludes that “the paradox of  intimate involvement 
without micromanagement defies definition.”
46Martin Hanna, “The Use of  Science in Theology: Case Studies of  Thomas 
F. Torrance and Langdon B. Gilkey” (Ph.D. dissertation, Andrews University, 2004). 
Walton’s proposal seems closer to the dialectical or correlational model for theology-
science relations proposed by Gilkey, where theology is involved with “correlatively . 
. . interpreting the human situation,” which is “formed largely by . . . science” (Message 
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In addition, I agree with the themes that Walton includes in his version 
of  a strong theology. I disagree, however, with the extent to which he neglects 
the concept of  supernatural miracles when he (1) emphasizes the role of  
science to “give definition to what God is doing and how he is doing it,”47 
(2) minimizes distinctions between functional creation and ongoing creative-
sustaining activity, (3) limits the significance of  the creation of  cosmic 
material, (4) distinguishes God’s person from his place in sacred space, (5) 
limits human imitation of  God’s creative work and Sabbath rest, (6) discusses 
the cosmic order and the disorder of  sin, (7) relates the human role to God’s 
intimate involvement with everything, and (8) explains the relations between 
moral and natural good and evil.48 
Finally, Walton has commented on the negative impact that secular 
scientific presuppositions can have on the credibility of  the biblical revelation.49 
Also, he has interpreted Genesis 1 in a way that seems to place the content of  
its revelation beyond the threat of  these scientific presuppositions. It may be, 
though, that scientific presuppositions have indirectly led him to underestimate 
the significance of  the scholarly research that suggests that Genesis 1 does 
present God as supernaturally creating, sustaining, and intervening in the 
cosmos. Therefore, the theological challenge of  scientific presuppositions 
should be addressed more directly. 
Both Davidson and Sparks point out the scientific presuppositions of  
the historical-critical method and the need for Christian theology to clarify 
its response to these presuppositions. Sparks allows for scientific criteria of  
historical criticism (i.e., methodological doubt, analogy, and correlation)50 to 
and Existence [New York: Seabury, 1979], 53, 57-58). I prefer the dialogical approach 
proposed by Thomas F. Torrance. “A theological science . . . cannot but contribute to the 
purity of  the human sciences, but it can hardly do that unless it is prepared to enter into a 
genuine dialogue with them. . . . This in turn will have a healthy impact upon theological 
science” (Theological Science [London: Oxford University Press, 1969], 284).   
47Walton, The Lost World of  Genesis One, 143.
48Ibid., 142-151.
49“The historical-critical method suggested that we should accept as true only that 
which can be empirically proven. The new historiography was concerned only with 
natural cause and effect in history” (John H. Walton, Victor Harold Matthews, Mark 
William Chavalas, eds., The IVP Bible Background Commentary: Old Testament [Downers 
Grove: InterVarsity, 2000], 211).  
50Sparks, 213-322. Modern skepticism about miracles has been influenced greatly 
by David Hume’s famous essay “On Miracles” (1748). The most influential advocate 
of  Hume in biblical and theological studies was Ernst Troeltsch (1865-1923), who 
introduced three fundamental principles of  historical criticism: methodological doubt, 
analogy, and correlation (Sparks, 314). According to Davidson, “The word ‘criticism’ 
is used here in the technical sense of  Descartes’ ‘methodological doubt’ and refers to 
the autonomy of  the investigator to interrogate and evaluate the scriptural witness, to 
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provide evidence for or against the historical accuracy of  biblical accounts 
of  supernatural miracles. But where Walton expresses theological reasons 
for rejecting the concept of  supernatural miracles, Sparks proposes that 
there may be theological reasons for affirming certain supernatural miracle 
accounts even when there may be insufficient historical-critical evidence to 
validate them. He regards some of  the supernatural miracles mentioned in the 
Bible as theologically necessary.51 
In contrast with Sparks, Davidson proposes that secular scientific 
presuppositions are unsuitable for historical-biblical research, though he 
uses similar study tools as Sparks.52 This approach to the study of  the Bible 
leads Davidson to a very different conclusion than Walton on the subject 
of  supernatural miracles. Davidson regards it as theologically necessary to 
recognize the need for “supernatural spiritual assistance” in interpreting 
Scripture.53 In addition, biblical scholars “must consciously reject any external 
keys or systems to impose on Scripture from without, whether naturalistic 
(closed system of  cause and effect without any room for the supernatural), 
judge the truthfulness, adequacy, and intelligibility of  the specific declarations of  the 
text. . . . The principle of  analogy . . . assumes that present experience is the criterion 
for evaluating events narrated in Scripture, inasmuch as all events are, in principle, 
similar. . . . The principle of  correlation states that history is a closed system of  cause 
and effect with no room for supernatural intervention. . . . This is not to say that all 
historical critics deny the existence of  God or the supernatural. But methodologically, 
historical criticism has no room for the supernatural” (“Biblical Theology,” 90).
51Sparks, 315-316, points out that “it is the very nature of  the case that miracles 
are not caused by antecedent historical events. Their cause is not a product of  human 
agency or of  natural events; their immediate cause is divine agency, which moves into 
history from without.” Nevertheless, miracles may be evaluated positively within a 
historical-critical approach because “Troeltsch seems to have overlooked something in 
his analysis of  miracles: once they occur, miracles certainly produce posterior historical 
effects. . . . Genuine miracles leave historical effects in their wake” (ibid., 318). Where 
there is insufficient historical evidence, “Perhaps we believe in the Bible’s miracles 
precisely because they are miracles of  the right sort. . . . So critical historiography does 
not hold all of  the cards when it comes to making judgments about history” (ibid., 
319). “There is no reason at all that the church should consider these matters only in 
terms of  modern historiography. The theological reflection of  the church . . . also 
counts as evidence in our historical equations” (ibid., 320, emphasis original).
52Davidson writes: “Those who follow the historical-biblical method apply similar 
study tools utilized in historical criticism. Careful attention is given to historical, literary 
and linguistic, grammatical-syntactical, and theological details, as outlined throughout 
this article. But while utilizing the gains brought about by the historical-critical method 
in sharpening various study tools for analysis of  the biblical text, there is a consistent 
intent to eliminate the element of  criticism that stands as judge upon the Word” (ibid., 
“Biblical Theology,” 96).
53Ibid., 66.
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evolutionary (the developmental axiom), humanistic (human beings as the 
final norm), or relativistic (rejection of  absolutes).”54 Therefore, his face-value 
reading is very different from Walton’s. Davidson concludes that “a Bible-
based hermeneutic accepts at face value the biblical accounts of  the creation 
of  this world . . . and the other historical assertions of  Scripture, including the 
supernatural, miraculous events.”55
4. Summary and Conclusion
Walton’s view of  miracles, Genesis 1, and theology-science relations is 
interrelated with his proposal that ancient cosmologies do not describe 
supernatural miracles. This led me to ask the question: How could all the 
events mentioned in Genesis 1 happen in seven days of  creation without 
supernatural miracles? Walton’s answer is that creation involved ceremonial 
and liturgical divine acts that established cosmic functions and installed 
cosmic functionaries. Therefore, viewed theologically, these actions are 
supernatural; and viewed scientifically, these actions are natural. This overlap 
of  perspectives also applies to the material origins of  the cosmos, which, for 
Walton, may be investigated by science. In this way, he avoids a “God of  the 
gaps” theology that is threatened by the progress of  scientific explanation.
In addition, Walton makes important distinctions between supernatural 
primary causation and natural secondary causation, and between God’s actions 
of  creating and sustaining. At the same time, he blurs these distinctions in 
a way that unfortunately leads to a practical identity between the cosmic 
process and God’s design, purpose, and action. This leads to the paradox of  
how God can be intimately involved in this way without micromanagement 
that precludes human freedom. Nevertheless, Walton concludes that the full 
integration of  theology and science will lead to a stronger theology that is not 
threatened by scientific presuppositions and conclusions. However, science 
may have influenced him to underestimate significant scholarly research that 
provides an alternative to his proposal. 
In contrast with Walton’s proposal, the historical-biblical research by 
Davidson suggests that Genesis 1 does indicate that supernatural acts by God 
were involved in the material and functional origins of  the cosmos. Moreover, 
these divine acts include supernatural interventions during and after the 
creation week. Also in contrast with Walton’s proposal, the historical-critical 
research by Sparks suggests that, since the concept of  divine action from 
outside the cosmos through supernatural miracles was widespread in ancient 
cultures, we have historical reasons to believe that such miracles do occur. 
Bible students would do well to explore the evidence supporting 
the interpretation of  Genesis 1 as indicating that it takes various kinds of  
54Ibid., 67.
55Ibid., 70.
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supernatural miracles for God to create, sustain, and intervene in the cosmos. 
From this perspective, the origin of  the cosmos cannot be reduced to cosmic 
processes. Neither can God be explained away by the progress of  science. 
In addition, God’s intimate involvement creates, sustains, and interacts with 
human freedom. While God does act indirectly through natural processes, 
he also acts directly to create, sustain, and intervene within them. God is 
always active, directly and indirectly. Either way, when God acts, it takes a 
supernatural miracle.
